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RECENT DECISIONS
to reverse. But a strong dissent argued that the court could not
assume the jury was not influenced, and urged a new trial because
the remarks were calculated to prejudice the jury, ". . . and that
is the single and sufficient reason for granting a new trial . .
(209 App. Div. at 286, 204 N. Y. Supp. at 697).
In the instant case the appellate court expressly conceded
that the jury verdict was adequately supported by the evidence
(283 App. Div. at 37, 125 N. Y. S. 2d at 372). The decision appears, therefore, to represent a recognition of the particularly
delicate nature of a divorce action, and indicates the propensity
of the courts to utilize the power of reversal for a new trial on
the ostensible grounds of prejudice as a disciplinary weapon
against counsel. While such decisions are defensible on ethical
grounds, they may have the practical effect of punishing an
innocent litigant for the offenses of counsel.
Morton Mendelsohn
CRIMINAL LAW -PERJURY CONVICTION UPHIELD
DESPITE GRAND JURY MISCONDUCT
LEADING TO INDICTMENT
Defendant, indicted for perjury as a result of statements
made before a federal grand jury investigating espionage activities, appealed his subsequent conviction alleging irregularities in
the grand jury proceedings and an improper charge to the jury.
The conviction was reversed and remanded on the latter grounds.
191 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 907 (1952).
Instead of proceeding on the original indictment, the government
returned a new indictment based on perjured testimony at the
first trial. Defendant, again convicted, urges that perjurious
statements made at a trial under an illegally procurred indictment cannot be subsequently prosecuted. Held (2-1): Assuming
without deciding that the first indictment was bad because of
government misconduct, the court had jurisdiction over the crime
and the person and the defendant could not lie with impunity.
U. S. v. Remington, 208 F. 2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74
Sup. Ct. 476 (1954).
The subsequent quashing of an indictment for failure to state
an offense does not immunize a defendant from prosecution for
perjury in the defense of that indictment as long as the court had
jurisdiction over the alleged crime and the person. U. S. v. Williams, 341 U. S. 58 (1951). The majority admitted that the instant
case was distinguishable because of the allegation of government
-misconduct but found no difficulty in extending the Williams doctrine in as much as the defendant had chosen to lie rather than
attack the indictment for illegality.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Learned Hand denied that the
Williams case, supra, was controlling, insisting that the government's action was akin to the illegal use of evidence and entrapment. He urged that since the government may not use evidence
it has gained directly or indirectly through illegal methods,
Nardone v. U. S., 308 U. S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385 (1920), any fruits from a bad indictment
cannot be utilized by the government. The majority rejected this
argument because the Nardone and Silverthorne cases, dealt with
evidence admissible in the prosecution of crimes already committed whereas the instant case deals with a new and separate
crime committed after the alleged government misconduct.
In Sorrells v. U. S., 287 U. S. 435 (1932), the defense of
entrapment was held to be available when the criminal design
originated in the mind of government officials who then persuaded
the accused to commit the criminal act. The dissenter felt this
doctrine should be broadened to cover the instant case, because
the government knew that the defendant must inevitably repeat
the statements which were the basis of the illegal indictment at
the trial or impliedly admit his guilt by his silence. But the
majority pointed out that a third avenue was open to the defendant and that was to attack the indictment for its illegality.
This writer suggests that the court was faced with choosing
between two wrongs; the government's misconduct and the defendant's subsequent perjury. Perhaps what troubled the dissenting jurist was the fact that the government had a marked
advantage over the defendant because of the secrecy involved in
grand jury proceedings and the difficulty encountered in attempting to obtain the record. The fact that the substantive offense in
both indictments was perjury does tend to convey the impression
that the defendant was caught in a web, but it was his own weaving
that ultimately led to his conviction. The majority decision is
sound, legally, but the dissent is indicative of the limit to which
a conscientious jurist will go to safeguard an individual's rights
in times of political turbulence.
Anthony J. Vaccaro
EXECUTION-WIE OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF RESTRAINING
PROVISION OF C. P. A. § 781
In proceedings supplementary to judgment a third-party subpoena was served on the judgment debtor's wife who, in spite of
the restraining provision, continued to expend the funds of her
husband which were in her bank account for the living require318

